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Abstract 
Historically, periods of increased trade and capital mobility have 
been also accompanied by more intense labor mobility across national 
borders. Conversely, in periods of global instability, stagnation, 
nationalism and more restrictive policies toward migration and capital 
mobility we observed less action in global factor markets. The first 
wave of globalization from around 1870 to 1913 was a period in which 
capital and labor were both free to move internationally. The interwar 
period with its economic turbulence, political disarray and rising 
nationalism witnessed both a movement towards reduced 
intercontinental migration and more chaotic and diminished capital 
flows. 
After World War II, the Bretton-Woods system restricted 
international private capital mobility and national governments gave 
more priority to the achievement of domestic policy goals. In the early 
1970s the Bretton-Woods dollar-gold standard was abandoned and 
international capital mobility surged. International financial 
intermediation, however, was of the type of “diversification finance” 
among industrial economies rather than one-way “development 
finance” observed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Since the 1970s international labor markets, particularly for 
unskilled labor, have remained more regulated than global capital 
markets, particularly regarding migration from developing countries. 
The source of global savings and investment balances changed in the 
1980s and 1990s as the United States started to run persistent current 
account deficits and became a net debtor economy. 
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This document analyzes various economic policy regimes and “political-economy epochs” 
since the 1870s to the early 21st century and their impact on international migration and 
international capital mobility. We take a long run view and examine to what extent periods of 
increased international migration have also been accompanied by periods of greater capital mobility 
and vice-versa. We investigate the patterns and interactions between these two types of international 
resource transfers and the changing global savings and investment balances in the world economy. 
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I. Introduction 
The international mobility of labor and capital are linked 
phenomena as the global economic history of the last century and a 
half shows. Therefore both phenomena must be analyzed jointly. In 
periods in which the world economy is open to trade and factor 
mobility, people and capital moved to countries, regions and cities that 
offered better jobs, more profits and higher wages than those 
encountered at home. Historically, periods of increased trade and 
capital mobility have been also accompanied by more intense labor 
mobility across national borders. Conversely, in periods of global 
instability, stagnation, nationalism and more restrictive policies toward 
migration and capital mobility we observed less action in global factor 
markets. The first wave of globalization from around 1870 to 1913 was 
a period in which capital and labor were both free to move 
internationally; as a consequence international labor and capital 
markets became more integrated than in any period afterwards. The 
interwar period with its economic turbulence, political disarray and 
rising nationalism witnessed both a movement towards reduced 
intercontinental migration and more chaotic and diminished capital 
flows. After World War II, the Bretton-Woods system restricted 
international private capital mobility and national governments gave 
more priority to the achievement of domestic policy goals. In the early 
1970s the Bretton-Woods dollar-gold standard was abandoned and 
international capital mobility surged. International financial 
intermediation, however, was largely concentrated in a group of 
economies with an important role played by “diversification finance” 
among   industrial   economies   rather   than   one-way   “development 
7 
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finance” of the type observed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Since the 1970s international 
labor markets, particularly for unskilled labor, have remained more regulated than global capital 
markets, particularly regarding migration from developing countries. Nevertheless, in spite of 
migration regulations, actual migration flows to the U.S and other industrial economies have been 
on the rise in the last two decades of the 20th century. The source of global savings and investment 
balances changed in the 1980s and 1990s as the United States started to run persistent current 
account deficits and became a net debtor economy. This feature reflects the low domestic savings 
relative to investment in the U.S. In contrast, countries that are running a large surplus of savings 
over investment (current account surplus) are Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea, and contribute to 
finance the current account deficits of the United States. On the side of international labor mobility, 
the U.S continued to be the main recipient country of immigrants in the world, a role that comes 
from the 19th century. 
This historically-oriented document analyses various economic policy regimes and “political-
economy epochs” since the 1870s to the early 21st century and their impact on international 
migration and international capital mobility. We take a long run view and examine to what extent 
periods of increased international migration have also been accompanied by periods of greater 
capital mobility and vice-versa. We investigate the patterns and interactions between these two 
types of international resource transfers, the direction of labor and capital flows throughout 
different historical periods and the relation with international inequality. We are also interested in 
identifying the changing global savings and investment balances in the world economy in terms of 
source and destinations of capital exports and imports. This document is organized in three sections 
besides this introduction. The second section briefly reviews the main analytical links between the 
international mobility of labor and capital; section three traces the historical evolution and 
interactions between global labor and capital markets in the two waves of globalization and the 
interwar (de-globalization) period. The fourth section concludes. 
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II. Migration flows and capital flows: 
conceptual issues 
The literature has focused, traditionally, on the relationship 
between international trade in goods and services and migration 
discussing whether trade and migration are complements or substitutes. 
In contrast, the relation between international capital and labor 
mobility has been compartively less studied. This paper focuses in the 
later topic. In a closed economy the demand for labor and capital are 
met by the domestic supply of these two factors. Macroeconomic 
equilibrium and factor market clearing takes place without flows of 
labor and capital to and from of the rest of the world. In contrast, in an 
open economy to international factor mobility international migration 
offers an additional adjustment mechanism to labor market imbalances 
in source and destination countries by altering the total supply of labor. 
Emigration reduces the supply of labor in the source country and 
immigration increases the supply of labor in the destination country. In 
general a country with a persistently higher real wage at home than 
abroad will tend to be a net immigration country. 
In turn, if there is an excess demand for investment relative to 
domestic savings the country will absorb foreign savings from the rest 
of the world by running a current account deficit in the balance of 
payments. Conversely, a country may run an excess of savings over 
investment, exporting capital, by running a surplus in its current 
account. An economy in which the (risk adjusted) rate of return of 
capital  at  home  is  lower  than the relevant (adjusted by country risk) 
9 
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rate of return of capital will export capital, all this for given levels of domestic and foreign incomes. 
Countries can have different configurations in labor markets and the savings-investment 
balance. A country can be either a net importer of labor (i.e. a net immigration country) or a net 
exporter of capital; alternatively it can be a net exporter of labor (emigration country) and be a net 
importer of capital. In turn, these configurations change over time as we shall see in this paper. 
The experience of the United States illustrates how a country can change its position of net 
exporter of capital over time. From the 19th century until the 1980s the U.S was, on average a net 
exporter of capital (and a net importer of people). That situation regarding the savings-investment 
balance changed in the 1980s when the country started to run persistent current account deficits as 
national savings fell short of investment, financing the gap with savings from the rest of the world, 
mainly from positive net savings economies in Asia. In addition, the U.S became a net debtor as its 
foreign liabilities exceed its net foreign assets. On the migration side, still the U.S continues to be a 
net immigration country and the ratio of foreign population to total population has increased over 
time. An example of how a country can change its net migration position over time is Argentina that 
at the turn of the 20th century was both a net immigration country -absorbing large contingents of 
immigrants coming mainly from Spain and Italy- while being a net importer of capital, chiefly from 
Great Britain. That situation reverted in the last decades of the 20th century and early 21st century as 
Argentina suffered from emigration flows particularly of high skills people and professionals due to 
the poor development prospects of the country and the lack of democracy during authoritarian 
periods. In turn, capital often flew out of the country, particularly during its repeated economic 
crises. 
Another factor that historically mattered for the direction of labor migration and capital flows 
was the abundance of natural resources in recipient countries. As we shall see below, in the 19th 
century the countries of the New World (Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United 
States) had abundance of natural resources (land, gold in some countries, mineral resources) and 
scarcity of labor and capital inviting an international transfer of these two resources to exploit 
natural resources. 
Another important factor that influences the international movement of capital and labor is 
the migration and capital account policy regime in recipient and source countries. Restrictive labor 
migration, quotas, special tests, visa systems and others have been used historically to restrict labor 
flows. In turn, tax on capital flows and capital repatriation, foreign exchange controls minimum 
reserve requirements have been used to reduce capital mobility. Exchange rate, monetary and fiscal 
policies also affect capital flows. 
Political considerations matter in international migration and capital flows. International 
investment is very sensitive to “political risk’ say the risk of expropriation or taxation of 
international capital flows or dividends of foreign investment due to political instability and social 
conflict in the recipient country. Also nationalism, populism, xenophobia and authoritarian politics 
against intellectuals and the working class reduce the international mobility of labor as we shall see 
in this historical overview. 
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III. A look at the historical evidence 
A synoptic view of the evolution of international capital 
mobility since the late 19th century until the early 21st century is 
provided by figure 1 borrowed from Obstfeld and Taylor (2004). In 
turn, figure 2 a) -c) shows the evolution, over a similar period,of labor 
immigration (in absoluter number, as a share of population and per 
source country/region) to the United States, the main immigration 
country in the last century and half or so. 
Figure 1 shows a rise of capital mobility between 1860 and 
1914, the period of the gold standard and first wave of globalization, 
followed by a sharp decline in the interwar years to slowly recuperate 
between 1945 and the early 1970s under the Bretton-Woods regime. 
Capital mobility accelerates after the breakdown of the Bretton- 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s due to the 
recycling of large oil revenues and the move to open capital mobility 
in industrial and, to some extent, developing countries. This trend 
deepens in the 1980s and 1990s, albeit punctuated by successive 
financial crises in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
11 
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Figure 1 
CONJECTURE? A STYLIZED VIEW OF CAPITAL MOBILITY IN MODERN HISTORY 
 
Source: Obstfeld and Taylor 2004, p. 127. 
 
Figure 2.a 
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
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Source: 2002 statistical yearbook of the immigration and naturalization service. 
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Figure 2.b 
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
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Source: 2002 statistical yearbook of the immigration and naturalization service. 
 
Figure 2.c 
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES BY REGION OF ORIGEN 
(share of U.S. populations, decade average, 1871-2002) 
 
Source: 2002 statistical yearbook of the immigration and naturalization service. 
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The dynamic of immigration to the U.S (see figures 2.a-2.c) resembles the pattern of capital 
mobility just described. There is a sharp increase in immigration flows (as a ratio of U.S population) 
between 1871 and1910 in the age of mass migration (first wave of globalization) followed by a 
decline in the economically unstable and politically volatile interwar years. After World War II 
migration flows start to increase gradually through the 1960s and 1970s to rapidly accelerate in the 
1980s, 1990s and early 21st century. The source of migrants also changed from European migration 
to migration from Latin America, Asia and Africa. Let us look now in more detail the patterns of 
migration and capital mobility through various sub-periods since the late 19th century until today. 
1. International labor and capital markets in the first wave of 
globalization (c. 1870-1913) 
The period of 1870-1913, characterized by free trade, free capital mobility and the gold 
standard,1 has been termed by economic historians as the “first wave of globalization”. This period 
was accompanied by large flows of international migration known as the “ age of mass migration” 
(Hatton and Williamson, 1998). In geopolitical terms this was a period of Pax- Britannica with 
London constituting the financial center of the world and the British pound the dominant currency 
in the context of the international gold standard. 
Migration Patterns. In the age of mass migration around 60 million people emigrated from 
resource-scarce, labor-abundant Europe to the resource-abundant, labor scarce countries of the New 
World including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. From 
1870-1920 more than 26 million migrants from all over the world went to the US. That period, up 
to the beginning of World War I was also a period of rapid growth of international trade, boosted by 
a decline in transport and communication costs associated with the development of the railway 
systems, steam-ship, electricity and the telegraph. Migrants to the New World came from both “core 
Europe” (England, Germany, France) and “peripheral Europe” (e.g. the relatively poorer 
Scandinavian countries, Spain, Italy and Portugal, Poland, Russia, Rumania and the former nations 
of the Austro-Hungarian empire, see figures 3 and 4). In Latin America the main destination 
country for migrants from Europe, mainly Spaniards and Italians, was Argentina that received near 
7 million immigrants (of which about 4 million returned back).2 Other countries that received a 
relatively considerable number of European migrants were Uruguay, Cuba, Mexico, and Chile. 
                                                     
1  See Eichengreen (1995) for an analysis of the gold standard in this and subsequent periods. 
2  See Solimano, (2002b) for an analysis of immigration and emigration from Argentina in the whole 20th century. See also Taylor, 
1994a) and b) for analysis of migration patterns to Argentina until the 1930s. 
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Figure 3 
PRE-WW1 BRITISH CAPITAL EXPORTS INTO SIX TIME PERIODS 
 
 
Source: Stone 1999. 
Figure 4 
EMIGRATION FROM EUROPE 1846-1924 (FIVE YEARS AVERAGES) 
 
 
Source: Ferenczi and Willcox (1929, pp. 230-31). 
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Figure 5 
IMMIGRATION TO THE AMERICAS, 1846-1924 
(five year averages) 
 
Source: Hatton and Williamson (1998), p.8. 
 
Two thirds of the migrants of this period were male and single, and traveled without other family 
members. More than three quarters of the immigrants to the United States were young, i.e. 16 to 40 years 
old. While an increasing number of migrants came from cities, the majority still came from the 
countryside, particularly those from Southern and Eastern Europe (Chiswick and Hatton 2003 p.70) Also, 
increasingly, migrants were unskilled and unschooled workers, as the source of migration changed for 
Southern and Eastern Europe, during this period. This important migration of unskilled and unschooled 
workers largely and definitively ended by the First World War (O’Rourke and Williamson 2000, p.123). 
An important driver of the direction of international migration flows were the significant income per 
capita differentials between peripheral European countries and the US, Canada, Australia and other 
countries of the new world during this period.  For example, table 1 indicates that the average real wage in 
European countries was 43 in 1870 and 77 in 1913 (with Great Britain = 100 in 1905). In those same years 
the index of real wages in the New World countries (average of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada and 
the United States) reached 88 and 139 respectively. So real wages in the new world were significantly 
higher than in Europe, motivating labor migration from Europe to the new world. Also the GDP per capita 
and GDP per worker-hour demonstrate better living standards and productivity in the New World 
countries. (O’Rourke and Williamson 2000, p.17). The level of per capita income of Argentina was around 
30 percent higher than Spain and Italy in 1913. These income gaps created strong economic incentives for 
international migration to Argentina. Uruguay also had higher per capita income than Spain and Italy in 
1913 and Chile was also at the same per-capita level as Spain and Italy. Indeed, the main real wage 
divergence existed between the Old World and the New World, rather than within the Old World or within 
the New World (Williamson 1992). 
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Table 1 
LIVING STANDARDS AND PRODUCTIVITY, 1870-1913 
 Real wages (Great 
Britain 1905=100) 





Country 1870 1913 1870 1913 1870 1913 
European periphery 
      
Austria NA NA 1 875 3 488 1.39 2.93 
Denmark 36 102 1 927 3 764 1.51 3.40 
Finland NA NA 1 107 2 050 0.84 1.81 
Ireland 49 90 NA NA NA NA 
Italy 26 55 1 467 2 507 1.03 2.09 
Norway 32 93 1 303 2 275 1.09 2.19 
Portugal 18 24 1 085 1 354 NA NA 
Spain 30 39 1 376 2 255 NA NA 
Sweden 28 98 1 664 3 096 1.22 2.58 
Average 31 72 1 476 2 599 1.18 2.50 
European Industrial core       
Belgium 60 94 2 640 4 130 2.12 3.60 
France 50 66 1 858 3 452 1.36 2.85 
Germany 58 92 1 913 3 833 1.58 3.50 
Great Britain 67 98 3 263 5 032 2.61 4.40 
Netherlands 57 78 2 640 3 950 2.33 4.01 
Switzerland NA NA 2 172 4 207 1.75 3.25 
Average 58 86 2 414 4 101 1.96 3.60 
Europe 43 77 1 878 3 242 1.57 3.05 
New World       
Argentina 61 92 1 311 3 797 NA NA 
Australia 127 128 3 801 5 505 3.32 5.28 
Brazil 39 87 740 839 NA NA 
Canada 99 219 1 620 4 213 1.61 4.21 
United States 115 169 2 457 5 307 2.26 5.12 
Average 88 139 1 986 3 932 2.40 4.87 
Source: O’Rourke and Williamson (2000), p.17. 
Although an important majority of migrants went from the Old World to the New World, still 
considerable flows of labor also occurred within the Old World and within the New World. For 
example, Great Britain received a large part of Irish migrants and many East Europeans went to 
Western European countries. Also, in the 1890s, more than half of the Italian migrants chose 
European destinations, mostly France and Germany. France and the Netherlands also received many 
migrants from Belgium. In the New World there was an important flow of migration from Canada 
to the United States, especially before the turn of the century (Hatton and Williamson 1998, p.9). 
Finally, migration also occurred in other parts of the world, for example from Europe (in particular 
from the Netherlands and Great Britain) to Southern and Eastern Africa and to South Asia, and also 
from Asia (in particular from China, India and Japan) to East Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacific 
islands, the Caribbean and the west coast of North America (Chiswick and Hatton 2003, p.71). 
Immigration Policies in the countries of the New World in the First Wave of Globalization3 
were, on the whole, liberal. Several New World countries (such as Argentina) set-up immigration 
agencies in European countries to attract and facilitate immigration flows that increased labor 
supply and supported rapid economic expansion. 
By mid-19th century, the Argentine government had granted land to facilitate immigrants to 
settle there and the government financed the costs of moving and housing for immigrants. The pro-
                                                     
3  The main reference on immigration policies of the new world countries during the first wave of globalization is Timmer and 
Williamson (1996). Other sources are Holloway (1997) for Brazil and Solberg (1970) for Argentina and Chile. 
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migration climate of the ruling elite in Argentina at that time was captured by the phrase, coined by 
the Argentinean thinker Juan Baustista Alberdi, “To Govern is to Populate”.4 However, gradually, 
policies supporting immigration became less generous. In 1916, new legislation introduced 
restrictions for different classes of immigrants (e.g. disabled people, unaccompanied women with 
children, etc.) and by the 1920s policies became definitely less favorable for immigration, being 
perceived as preventing the improvement of living standards of domestic labor. 
Ethnic discrimination (against migration from Asia, particularly from China) was a common 
practice in several receiving countries. In the second half of the 19th century U.S. immigration 
legislation went through different changes. To begin with, immigration policy became federal rather 
than state legislation. Racial considerations were important. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act 
passed by the U.S. Congress blocked Chinese migration for nearly eighty years until the 1965 
Immigration Act removed the discriminatory quota system. American historian L. Ling-chi Wang 
notes, “America was open to everybody who wanted to come. We welcomed everybody. The only 
people we excluded by law at that time were prostitutes, lepers, and morons, and in 1882 we added 
Chinese to that list”.5 In 1917 a new Immigration Act established a literacy test for immigrants and 
in 1921 quotas were established to restrict immigration. In general immigrants from Canada, 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean to the U.S. were treated more favorably than 
immigrants coming from Asian countries. The U.S Immigration Committee published its’ forty-one 
volume report in 1911 which made a sharp distinction between the old immigrants (those from 
Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and Switzerland) 
and the new immigrants (those from Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, and Turkey). The commission presented a report negative 
on new immigration concluding that “the new immigration on the whole were ‘far less intelligent’ 
and were ‘actuated by different ideals’ than the old immigrants”.6 Immigration was seen as keeping 
real wages down and increasing domestic inequality (an issue we will return in chapter 3). In this 
period, strong labor unions contributed to develop an attitude less friendly to immigration that was 
being perceived as preventing a more steady improvement in living standards of the American 
working class. 
In Australia, in the 19th century, immigration policies tended to favor those coming from 
British Commonwealth countries by subsidizing the transportation of immigrants and supporting 
them at arrival. At the same time Australia restricted the immigration of Chinese citizens through 
taxes and quotas. Some of these laws were repealed afterwards and then adopted again. In the early 
20th century Australia naturalization laws became aligned with England’s. Brazil also encouraged 
emigration and settlements through subsidies, special benefits for land acquisition and other budget 
support. In the case of Brazil, immigration helped to substitute the effects on labor supply of 
abolition of slavery in the late 19th century, for the sugar –producing areas (north-east) and coffee-
producing areas in the São-Paulo province.7 Later on, like in the cases of Argentina and Australia, 
Brazilian legislation became more restrictive in the first two decades of the 20th century. In Canada 
by the 1860s the parliament granted autonomy to the provinces to handle immigration issues and 
policies. Land was offered at reduced prices to encourage immigrants to settle in Canada. In 1910 
immigration from Asian countries was restricted through a higher head tax than that of immigrants 
from non-Asian countries. 
In sum, immigration policies in the countries of the New World in several cases promoted 
and encouraged international migration in response to the need for increased labor supply to support 
rapid economic expansion. However, these policies became gradually more restrictive towards the 
end of that century and the early 20th century, particularly in the 1910s and 1920s. Ethnic 
                                                     
4  See Solberg (1970). 
5  Source: http://www.asianreporter.com/arts/12-03chinamer.htm.. 
6  See Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson (1998) p. 124. 
7  See Holloway (1977). 
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discrimination (against migration from Asia, in particular from China) was a common practice, 
particularly in Australia, Canada and the US, a feature seemingly absent in Argentinean and 
Brazilian immigration policies at that time. 
International Capital Markets. Like the migration flow, the global capital flow also sharply 
increased during the first wave of globalization, as we can see in the figure 1. Interested in the 
exploitation of the abundant and cheap natural resources of the New World and considering the 
immobility of these resources, the countries of the Old World started to invest and to export 
technologies to the countries of the New World, where there were a scarcity of capital. These 
capital flows accelerated after 1870, as more and more countries joined the gold standard, initiated 
by the United Kingdom in 1717. During that time, an increasing number of countries became 
interested in abandoning silver-based money for the credible and stable gold-standard as a way to 
improve their commercial and financial relations with the leading world economic power. But the 
vast majority of these countries, except the western European countries, did not adopt the gold-
standard until the end of the nineteenth century. From these national decisions to use gold for global 
commercial and financial transactions and in a context of improved technologies in transport and 
communication a new monetary system of fixed exchange-rates without capital controls or an active 
role of banks was created. This expanding liberal capital market, joined to the improving national 
banking systems, allowed for an expanded global commercial network and wide range of 
international transactions: bills of exchange, bond finances, equity issues, foreign direct investment, 
etc. Between 1900 and 1914, the period considered as the zenith of the classical gold-standard, 
foreign assets were estimated at almost 20 percent of global GDP, while they represented only 7 
percent thirty years before (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). 
Regarding the direction and source of capital flows during this period, the most important 
flow of capital occurred from Great Britain to the New World countries, more or less following the 
same trajectory as the migration flows. London constituted the financial center of the global market 
and was called the “banker of the world”. It is estimated that the surplus of domestic savings over 
investment in the U.K was around 50 percent in the first decade of the 20th century (Obstfeld and 
Taylor, 2004). The British pound was the dominant currency in the context of the international gold 
standard. The United Kingdom contributed to a peak average of 80 percent of total global foreign 
investment. For example, between 1907 and 1913, Britain’s foreign assets were estimated at £1,127 
million, from which 61 percent or £689 million went to Canada, Australasia, Argentina and the 
United States. This percentage rises to 76% or £857 million if we add the other countries of Latin 
America (Taylor and Williamson 1994, p.1). This region continued receiving a significant amount 
of capital until the 1930s. 
Capital flows in this period were characterized by the accumulation of enormous one-way 
positions and a great portfolio diversification by the principal creditor countries, in particular Great 
Britain, and inversely little diversification and high foreign capital “dependence” by the debtor New 
World countries. For example, foreigners held one-fifth of the capital stock of Australia and owned 
almost half of the capital stock of Argentina. Even the United States presented high levels of 
foreign capital dependence at the end of the century, in spite of its increasing domestic savings and 
investments since the 1830s (O’Rourke and Williamson 2000, p.209). Thus, gross assets during this 
period were almost equal to net assets. Also investments took the form of long-term finance to less 
developed countries, what Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) called “development finance”. For example, 
in 1900, one third of global assets went to countries in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, Asia 
and Africa. We will see later on that the situation is very different in today’s global capital markets. 
It is interesting to note that capital flew to rich and labor-scarce New World countries instead 
of going to poor and labor-abundant Asian and African countries, where it could, in principle, have 
been more profitable given the abundance of cheap labor. Indeed, as indicated in table 2 the labor-
scarce New World countries, where only a tenth of the world’s population lived, received two-
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thirds of the British capital in 1913-14, while labor-abundant Asia and Africa, accounting for two-
thirds of the world’s population, only received a quarter of European foreign investment (Clemens 
and Williamson 2000). 
Table 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1913-1914 
(in percent) 
Destination Britain France Germany 
Eastern Europe 3.6 35.5 27.7 
Western Europe 1.7 14.9 12.7 
Europe (not specified) 0.5 3.3 5.1 
Total Europe 5.8 53.8 45.5 
Latin America 20.1 13.3 16.2 
North America and Australasia 44.8 4.4 15.7 
Other New World (not specified) 2.8 0.0 2.1 
Total New World 67.7 17.7 34.0 
Asia and Africa 26.5 28.4 20.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Clemens and Williamson 2000, p.36. 
Germany and France also became important financial centers just before the turn of the 20th 
century, but did not reach the same level of capital exports as Britain. As table 2 shows French and 
German assets went mostly to European instead of New World destinations, unlike British capital 
exports, while also a small part went to poor and labor-abundant countries. Finally, while the 
United States had always been a debtor country before 1900, it started becoming a major assets 
holder and creditor at the beginning of the 20th century. British capital exports rose sharply at the 
beginning of the twentieth century as shown in fugure 3. While it could be explained in part by the 
addition of new destinations like Japan, Russia or Turkey due to a changing political relations, the 
most important explanation, according to Feis (1930), is that the earlier investments in the New 
World countries had proved the stability, the safety and the profitability of theses investments and 
had encouraged more capital exports toward theses countries. 
Interactions. An important feature of the first wave of globalization is that both labor and 
capital went from Old World European countries to the New World. From northern and southern 
Europe for migration and from Britain, France and Germany for capital flows to New World 
countries. The most plausible explanation for this direction of the flow of labor and capital is the 
attractiveness and economic opportunities open by the abundance of natural resources such as 
fertile land, minerals, gold and other resources in new world countries. In Europe in many countries 
labor was abundant and job opportunities were limited. In turn, for main capital-exporting countries 
such as England, followed by Germany and France, the availabilities of national savings exceeded 
the demand for investment. Thus, capital (or savings) went abroad to seize opportunities not 
available in the home countries. The New World abundant natural resources and the higher real 
wages attracted many immigrants from the Old World. This increased New World labor supply 
augmented the investment requirements and also housing needs that was also missing in the New 
World to exploit fully the abundant natural resources. The savings-investment balance in the 
receiving countries is also worth examining.In the new world capital importing countries, national 
savings fell short of investment. The difference was to be provided by foreign savings or capital 
imports. Some authors (see Taylor and Williamson, 1994) have examined the hypothesis of higher 
dependency-rate gaps, i.e. dependence of the young/old on working age family members in the new 
world than in old world countries. This hypothesis predicts lower savings ratios in New World 
countries that have higher dependency ratios than Old World countries. 
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That labor moved from relatively lower wage (labor abundant) European countries to higher 
wage (labor scarce) new world countries is fully understandable, provided migration regimes were 
open to (mass) flows of migration as it was the case at that time. However, the direction of capital 
flows is less obvious. One possibility was for financial capital to “stay in Europe” taking advantage 
of cheaper labor than in the New World. However, as we saw before the demand for investment was 
lower than the supply of savings in the main capital exporting European countries. The existence of 
natural resources in the New World created investment opportunities not available at home. 
However, the question arises also of why capital did not go (in massive) amounts to labor abundant 
countries such as Africa and Latin America that also were abundant in natural resources and had 
lower wages than the New World countries. The answer lies in that cheap labor is probably not the 
most important factor governing the direction of capital flows (i.e foreign investment). Other 
economic and political conditions in the recipient country also count. Capital to be invested 
productively and earn an attractive rate of return needs also a work force with adequate skills and 
education levels, property rights that can be enforced and institutions “friendly” to foreign capital. 
Apparently, these conditions were more likely to be found in the New World countries than in poor 
Africa and backward Latin America (with the exception, perhaps, of Argentina). In addition, we 
have to remember that several New World countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
States) had closer ties (either for being former colonies and or members of the British 
commonwealth) with Britain the dominant power at that time and the main source of capital in the 
world economy. 
2. Economic instability, political turbulence and de-globalization 
(1913-1945) 
World War I (WWI) interrupted the process of economic interdependence and labor market 
integration (although this later started to face restrictive practices) across countries that 
characterized the first wave of globalization. Beginning in 1914 with the onset of WWI, a period of 
de-globalization was inaugurated with near 30 years of economic instability (high inflation, 
macroeconomic volatility, disintegration of capital markets) and political turbulence. After the war, 
the main European empires disintegrated: the Romanov following the Russian revolution of 1917, 
the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire of the Habsburg monarchy and the Kaiser in 
Germany. In the years to come, recomposing a stable economic and geo-political equilibrium 
proved to be exceedingly complicated. 
Migration Patterns. In the interwar years, “political migration” became an important feature 
of the international mobility of population. The Bolshevik revolution led significant emigration 
flows from Russia in the initial years of the revolution. Rising nationalism and xenophobia in 
Germany led to emigration flows, mainly of Jewish population. General Franco’s Spain in the late 
1930s also ignited massive emigration of defeated Republicans and their families from authoritarian 
Spain. At the same time, on the other side of the Atlantic the United States was restricting 
immigration since the late 1910s and more fully in the 1920s. In turn, Europe was not particularly 
open to migration flows and refugees in the interwar years. 
Migration flows to the United States fell sharply during the interwar period with its lowest 
level during the Great Depression years of the 1930s, as we can see in figure 2. Indeed, in some 
years of that decade, emigration from the United States to Europe reached higher levels than 
immigration to the U.S causing a unique situation of negative net migration (Chiswick and Hatton 
2003 p.74). This interwar period was characterized by increasingly restrictive immigration policies 
in the New World countries, mainly in the 1920s. Moreover, the great depression of the early 1930s 
in the United States further contributed to reduce immigration to this country. These restrictive 
immigration policies in the New World caused an important change in actual migration flows. 
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As a consequence of the U.S enacting immigration quotas in 1921 and 1924, the flow of 
immigrants coming from Europe declined from near one million migrants per year to around 
350,000 (James, 2001). Canada also enacted list of “preferred source countries” for immigrants 
(non-preferred countries were those of southern and eastern Europe). In this policy climate, 
migrants coming from the Old War started to switch to Brazil and Argentina. During this period 
Argentina received around 3 million immigrants from Europe in the 1920s although as many as 2 
millions returned.8 European migration tried to turn also intra-continent with France being the 
largest and more open recipient of migrants. Italy was the main source country of migration in 
France. At the same time emigration restrictions were enacted in the Soviet Union that reduced 
Russia’s share in global migration flows to the Americas. In the early 1930s, South Africa also 
strongly discouraged immigration as well as Australia that had powerful labor unions, restricted 
immigration from Eastern Europe and Italy.9 
The new League of Nations reformed trade negotiations so they were no longer bilateral and 
instead was conducted within a framework of large international conferences. Out of the Versailles 
Treaty, the International Labor Organization was born. Historian Harold James notes that, “rarely 
had there been so much enthusiasm for internationalism and international institutions as in the 
1920s”.10 Yet migration policies had never been stricter. 
Importantly, the inauguration of the League of Nations marked a new system of power in 
European relations based on the quest for economic stability and collective security. For the past 
three hundred years, Europe’s system was based on a balance of power and alliance system.11 
However, the League of Nations proved unable to fulfill the underlying premise of collective’s 
security - the prevention of war and collective resistance to aggression. This became evident in the 
League’s failure to respond to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the 1935 Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia, the last independent African nation. Without an effective global security 
system, Germany, under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann -Germany’s Foreign Minister and 
then Chancellor in 1923 until his death in 1929- was able to successfully rearm. 
Besides the rise of Nationalistic ideologies, the inter-war years were isolationist and anti-
trade and anti-immigration because of a globalization backlash. A world of passports and visas 
became pervasive in those years. Hostility to economic globalization, particularly towards the late 
1920s was based on the perception that globalism brought inherent instability and volatility to 
populations already exhausted by economic insecurity and political turbulence in the 1920s. In the 
1930s the great depression further contributed to this belief. Globalization in that period was 
perceived as a system that fails because “humans and the institutions they create cannot handle the 
psychological and institutional consequences of the interconnected world".12 Another factor that 
created an atmosphere hostile to globalization was the rise in domestic inequality.13 Economic 
historians Hatton and Williamson state that this rise of inequality between citizens was another 
contributing factor to the breakdown of globalization in the interwar years. “It appears that the 
inequality trends that globalization produced are at least partly responsible for the interwar retreat 
from globalization manifested by immigration quotas, tariffs, restrictions on international capital 
flows, competitive devaluations, and other autarkic policy interventions. This fact should make us 
look to the next century with some anxiety: will the world economy retreat once again from its 
                                                     
8  See Chiswick and Hatton, 1920. 
9  See James (2001). 
10  See Harold James (2001) p. 25. 
11  Polanyi, K. (1944).  
12  See Harold James (2001) pp. 4-5. 
13  To counteract in-egalitarian trends some European governments tightened immigration policy and increased social spending. In 
France, social services accounted for 4.3 percent of central government expenditure in 1912, but 21.7 percent in 1928; the 
comparable figures for Germany are 5.0 percent and 34.2 percent (see James, 2001). 
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commitment to globalization?”.14 The League of Nations failure at providing global security 
generated no effective checks on the growing nationalist movements15 like Nazism in Germany and 
Fascism in Italy. The rise of extreme nationalism in the form of fascism, Nazism and other national 
movements in former Austrian-Hungarian countries was not a completely new phenomenon in 
Europe, although it reached proportions unheard of in the 1930s, mainly in Germany. The roots to 
central European nationalism that emerged in the inter-war period can be traced back to 1848 and 
the fall of Prince Klemens von Metternich of the Hapsburg Dynasty. The Revolutions of 1848 and 
countries exhaustive search for independence began the formation of Nationalism that re-emerged 
in new forms in the inter-war years. Historian Robert Wiebe provides some interesting insights into 
the rise and fall of Nationalist movements in Europe over the last 150 years. Wiebe (2002) cites 
Nationalist movements in Europe as growing out of a vast demographic revolution that doubled 
Europe’s population between 18th and late 19th century, driving tens of millions of people from the 
land into cities and across oceans and countries, in the great migrations beginning in 1800. Wiebe 
(2002) points out that Irish nationalism grew out of overpopulation and famine and centered on 
hatred of the British. While German nationalism, was rooted in Prussia’s humiliation of its old 
enemy France in 1870.16 
The Nationalist movements that grew in Europe in this time contributed to anti-immigration 
attitudes and policies and contributed to the animosity that exploded into World War II. This 
climate led to emigration of Jewish minorities in Central Europe to Britain, north and South 
America as intolerance and racism developed. 
At the same time, both Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy justified the need to conquer new 
territory in order to support a labor-abundant, land-scarce population. Nazi and Fascist leaders saw 
territorial expansion as a substitute of emigration. In this vein, Mussolini justified the Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia as a search for an outlet in Africa for the surplus Italians. In turn, Hitler 
maintained that his people, who he deemed superior to others, had the right to expand their nation 
state and territorial holdings to maintain a steady standard of living if population growth infringed 
on this standard of living.17 Germany’s policy of Lebensraum in the east led to the annexation of 
Austria and Czechoslovakia in the 1937 complemented by forced emigration of one million of 
Austrians and two million from Czechoslovakia.18 
The Disruption of Global Capital Markets. During the inter- war period capital flows fell 
dramatically as a consequence of economic and political instability and the use of foreign exchange 
and capital controls. While the average annual flow of capital from Britain, France, Germany and 
the United States to the rest of the world was US$1.4 billion between 1911 and 1913, it fell sharply 
to US$860 million or US$550 million between 1924 and 1928. Moreover, the United States took 
the place of Britain as “banker of the world” and became the most important foreign creditor, with 
New York as the new world financial center. Between 1924 and 1930, for example, the United 
States assumed 60% of global capital flows, estimated at US$9 billion, and possibly as much as 
US$11 billion, while US$1.3 billion and US$1.34 billion came from Britain and France 
                                                     
14  See Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson (1998) p. 248. For further analysis of inequality issues see Solimano, 1998 and 
2001b). 
15  Harold James asserts in his book, The End of Globalization: Lessons Learned From the Great Depression, that nationalism is derived 
by two distinct processes. First, nationalism is a state’s formulation of identities and commonalities in response to an external threat 
or the perception of a threat. He notes that this can and has easily translated into xenophobia. Secondly, nationalism is a process of 
institution-building, which is justified by the typical political construct of the 19th century that a nation-state evolved as a defensive 
mechanism against threats to stability from outside. 
16  James J. Sheehan, who wrote the forward to Wiebe’s book, further explains that the rise of Nazism in Germany was an extreme case 
of the rise of an all powerful state where the state, “entices nationalists into Faustian bargains in which it offers power in exchange 
for their democratic souls.” Nationalism manipulated historical memory to build exaggerated or false ideas of nationalist identity. In 
the context of the emergence of Nazism and its’ demagogic leader, scholars point out that Hitler’s authoritarian nationalism partly 
grew out of his historical memory of Germany’s loss in WWI. 
17  Hitler in Mein Kampf cites the “popular” ideology of the need for more land to support a growing population. “The right to possess 
soil can become a duty if without the extension of its soil a great nation seems doomed to destruction.”See  Ian Kershaw ( 1999). 
18  See James, 2001. 
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respectively. Also, during this inter-war period, Germany received the larger part of these capital 
exports for its reconstruction of the damage of World War I (James 2002, p.48). 
The economic “order” of the interwar period was very different of that of the pre-1914 years. 
Attempts at restoring the gold standard in the mid 1920s proved ultimately futile. The prerequisites 
for a reasonably well-functioning gold standard such as fiscal conservatism and wage flexibility 
were simply not there. In addition, the economic policies of World War I based in price and foreign 
exchange controls, large fiscal deficits were not favorable to the development of capital markets 
always distasteful of controls and fiscal imbalances. The 1920s saw also the big inflations of 
Austria, Germany and Hungary and subsequent stabilization under the supervision of the League of 
Nations19. Although economic stabilizations proved successful they were unable to bring an orderly 
exchange rate system and lasting prosperity to Europe. 
In the early 1930s, many countries abandoned the gold standard, depreciated their currencies 
and imposed tighter capital controls in order to reach domestic political and economical goals. The 
“trilemma” between fixed exchange rates, free capital mobility markets and independent economic 
policies geared to domestic goals of high employment and growth was tilting towards the third 
objective, sacrificing free capital mobility. As stated by Taylor (1999):  
[…] the literature on the collapse of the interwar gold standard indicates that various forces 
including crises of expectations, asymmetries in the equilibrating mechanism, recent memories of 
hyperinflation in some countries, increased speculation in expanding future markets, and 
temptations for competitive devaluation, all rendered the gold standard “unsafe for use” in the 
1920s and 1930s, at least when governments came under increased pressure after 1929 to engage in 
macroeconomic management to stave off the threat of deflation and depression20.  
In the context of the Great Depression, private capital flows wereregarded with suspicion. 
Also all the real wages convergence gained prior to WWI was lost with the Great Depression, 
reaching in 1945 the wage dispersion of the late 1870s (Williamson 1992). 
In the 1930s and 1940s private capital flows were minimal. By 1930 foreign assets 
represented just 8% of world output. It increased in the 1930s to reach 11% in 1938, but then fell to 
only 5% in 1945 at the end of  World-War II (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). Indeed, after the crisis of 
1931, long-term capital flows practically ceased and about US $3.5 billion, shifted back to the 
United States and Britain as a reaction to economic instability and anticipated war in Europe (James 
2002). Also changed the form of capital flow from portfolio to foreign direct investment (O’Rourke 
and Williamson 2000, p.212).  Britain continued to export little capital to its dominions, and also 
became a short-term debtor during this period. 
Interactions. The interwar years were, in practice, “unfriendly” to the international mobility 
of labor and capital. Moreover, during the interwar years important changes took place regarding 
migration and capital flows. First, the United States became the most important net capital exporter 
in the world economy, replacing England in that role, although this trend had already begun at the 
end of the previous period. A second important change in this period is that European migration to 
the New World definitively stopped and even reversed to become intra-continental. Forced 
movements of population among countries also took place following political and ethnic 
persecution in Europe, particularly in the 1930s and early 1940s. Third, the attempts at restoring the 
gold standard in a political and social context in which wage flexibility and fiscal discipline was 
difficult to enforce stresses the lack of a feasible political equilibrium compatible with exchange 
rate stability and free capital mobility. The growing power of labor unions, the emergence of 
populism and nationalism, the demands for democratization already present at the beginning of the 
century but now more difficult to steer, made the restoration of the pre 1914 economic order an 
                                                     
19  See Solimano (1991) for an analysis of League of Nations led stabilization policies in Central Europe in the 1920s . 
20  Taylor (1999), p.7. 
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ephemeral and ultimately futile goal. The instability of the 1920s, the depression of the early 1930s 
and an anti-globalization sentiment (without that name) were all inimical to the free mobility of 
people and capital across national boundaries. In this environment, there was a proliferation of 
immigration quotas, visa systems, ethnic discrimination, tariffs, restrictions on international capital 
flows, competitive devaluations, and other autarkic policy interventions. Definitely a strong departure 
from the liberal economic policies and cosmopolitanism of the pre- 1914 era. In Latin America, the 
instability of capital markets in the 1920 affected the supply of foreign capital and the depression of 
the 1930s hit hard the economies of the region and prompted the adoption of inward -looking, import- 
substitution policies. 
3. The post 1945 period: reconstruction and the second wave of 
globalization 
Towards the end of World-War II (WWII) , it was clear that economic reconstruction and 
global peace needed a new set of political and financial institutions at international level. Global 
capitalism was seen an inherently unstable system; prone both to periods of volatility and inflation, 
as in the 1920s, or to recessionary trends without self correcting mechanisms that assure full 
employment, as it was patently demonstrated in the 1930s. 
The United Nations was formed to preserve world peace and boost economic development in 
less advanced areas of the world. A new set of global financial institutions emerged in the mid 
1940s, known as the Bretton Woods Institutions largely shaped under the dictum of the United 
States and the United Kingdom personified in their key representatives Harry Dexter White and 
John Maynard Keynes, respectively. The International Monetary Fund was given the mandate of 
assuring a normal payments system under a system of fixed exchange rates, and providing external 
financing to countries running balance of payments deficits. Private capital movements were 
maintained closely restricted. The role of the World Bank was to provide long term financing for 
economic reconstruction and development. A world trade organization was proposed but never 
implemented (until the mid 1990s with the creation of the World Trade Organization); the 
International Labor Office, founded, in 1919 continued its existence. 
The end of the war, the economic reconstruction of Europe and the rebuilding of trade and 
investment relations among nations in the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s gave rise to a 
new period of economic prosperity and stability in the global economy that lasted until the early 
1970s (the so-called “golden age of capitalism”). This period has been a period of Pax Americana 
with the U.S dollar as the main world currency for international transactions. The post 1945 period 
can be usefully divided in two sub-periods: the Bretton-Woods era lasting until 1971-73 and the 
post 1973 period of flexible exchange rates, financial globalization and increased migration flows.  
Migration Patterns. International labor markets operate under a more constrained 
immigration policy framework than the one that existed until 1913 but probably freer than in the 
inter-war years. Whereas the recovery post-World War II encouraged more permissive immigration 
policies in developed countries at the beginning of that period, increasing immigration and slower 
real-wage growth during the 1970s forced these countries to switch back to more restrictive 
immigration policies, in particular for people with low skills and the poor. In contrast, well-
educated, skilled migrants (e.g. international executives, information technology experts, etc.) face 
much more open immigration regimes than less skilled labor in industrial countries. Thus, these 
constraints exerted on migration flow limited strongly the potential of migration and caused an 
excess of immigration demand, that exerted pressure on receiving countries in the form of 
increasing waiting list and illegal immigration. (Hatton and Williamson 2002, pp.2-3) 
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The direction of international migration flows changed significantly during the second half of 
the 20th century. European emigration (which lasted until the 1950s) declined and immigration to 
the United States, Canada and Europe from Latin America, Asia and Africa increased.21 In the 
1820-1920 period, European migration to the U.S was around 88 percent of total migration, in 
contrast in the period 1971-1998 the percentage of European migration declined to around 14 
percent.22 
Total immigration to the United States increased from about 1 million migrants per decade in 
the 1940s and 2.5 million migrants in the 1950s to near 7.5 million migrants per decade, on average, 
in the 1980s and 1990s.23 Still as a share of total population international migration to the U.S in the 
post 1970 period is below that of the first wave of globalization (1870-1913). The United States 
underwent since the 1960s significant changes in the legislation regarding immigration.24 The 1965 
amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act was intended to regulate immigration 
through a preference system according to family status regarding US citizens and encouraged 
immigrants with skills in short supply in the U.S. Nationality quotas were still in effect but an 
attempt was made to avoid ethnic discrimination. That legislation was changed again in 1986 in an 
attempt at trying to curb illegal immigration through tightened border control while at the same time 
creating schemes of regularization of aliens. The 1990 Immigration Act replaced the system of 
preference based on family reunification by a system of visas distribution according to occupational 
attributes. In turn, another law amendment in 1996 sought to further reduce illegal migration 
through a new Illegal Immigrant Reform and Responsibility Act. 
The role of Europe as a source of migrants also changed in the post 1950 world. After WWII, 
as Europe was recovering from the war, and through the 1950s, many Europeans left to the United 
States, Canada, Argentina, Australia and other countries in search for better economic conditions. 
However, as European output and job creation accelerated in the 1950s and income per capita 
differentials with destination countries narrowed (i.e. Argentina’s advantage over Italy and Spain 
disappeared completely in the 1970s) the incentives to emigrate overseas started to fade away. At 
the same time, intra-European migration increased reflecting income per capita differentials within 
Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s there was significant migration from Portugal, Spain, Italy to richer 
European countries such as Germany, France, England, Sweden and others. In turn, severe 
restrictions to international migration from the socialist countries of Eastern Europe to the west 
were enacted since the mid to late 1950s. A reality that changed swiftly after the collapse of 
communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to emigration from Russia, and other Eastern 
European countries to Western Europe, the U.S, Israel and other destinations; an option largely 
closed under the “ancien socialist regime”.25 In the European Union (EU) immigration policies are, 
largely, defined at supra-national level. The main feature of EU migration policies is a sharp 
distinction between the EU and non-EU origin of the migrants: while EU citizens have full rights to 
reside and work in any country of the Union, the latter faces restrictions to immigration and needs 
working visas to reside legally and work in the European Union area. International migration from 
the new member countries to the EU will be subject to a transitional period of 7 years. The schedule 
for trade liberalization and capital mobility is in general faster than for migration. 
                                                     
21  In the period 1971-98, the main source region of immigration to the U.S. was Latin America (46 percent of the total), followed by 
immigration from Asia (34 percent). Historically, Mexico, Cuba and the Dominican Republic are the principal Latin American 
sending countries of immigrants.  Illegal migration in the U.S. rose during the 1990s, from 3.3 millions in 1992 to 5 millions in 1996. 
Illegal immigrants in the US are coming from several countries: Mexico followed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Canada and the Philippines. The main Asian sending countries were the Philippines, China, Korea and India, and the main European 
sending countries are Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and Ireland. 
22  Source OECD (2003) “Trends in International Migration” p.19. 
23  International migration to the U.S as a  share of total population, declined from around 7 percent  in the period 1871-1920 to 2.5 
percent in the last third of the 20th century. Between 1999 and 2000, nearly 850,000 new permanent immigrants were admitted in 
2000, up more than 30% from the previous year. 
24  For a discussion of U.S. immigration policies since the 1960s, see Sassen (1998) and Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1998). 
25  See Solimano (2002a).  
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Freedom of movement is much older in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, and Sweden), a passport-free zone since 1954. Furthermore, in 1996, Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden joined the Schengen system,26 while Iceland and Norway (non-EU members) 
negotiated co-operation agreements. Even older practices in this regard can be found in Austral-
Asia where, since 1920 there has been no restriction on mobility between New Zealand and 
Australia. In 1973 both countries signed the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which allowed 
both countries citizens to live and work in either country free of permits. 
In contrast, North America (including Mexico) is a case in which free trade and liberal 
foreign investment policies among Canada, the U.S and Mexico co-exist with restrictive migration 
policies for migrants coming from Mexico. In fact, NAFTA, in effect since 1994, authorizes only a 
limited number of temporary work visas for Mexicans, and unlimited temporary work visas (TN 
visa) for Canadians.27.28 
During the 1990s, OECD countries have tended to favor trade agreements over common 
markets with third countries (taking the EU as a unity) as the later arrangement would imply free 
immigration policies within a common market area. In the case of NAFTA, liberalization of trade 
and investment between the U.S. and Canada with Mexico did not include a relaxation of the 
barriers to entry of migrants from Mexico to the U.S. (rather NAFTA tightened them). In the case of 
the EU, an interesting case is Turkey, a country with large emigration flows towards Europe. The 
EU signed a trade agreement with Turkey but postponed, for later periods, negotiations for full 
people mobility in the EU. 
Evolution of global capital markets. International capital mobility increased very gradually 
between 1945 and 1971 in the Bretton-Woods system but accelerated significantly in the 1970s, 1980s and 
particularly in the 1990s when confidence in global capital markets was greatly boosted by the collapse of 
communism and the growing enthusiasm with market economics promoted by the U.S. Developed 
economies integrated their capital markets with each other much more rapidly than developing countries . 
Capital account convertibility among industrial countries started in the 1970s and was fully completed in 
the 1990s. In turn, several Latin American countries and other developing nations, although opened their 
economies to private capital inflows in the 1970s, they suffered the debt crises of the early 1980s that 
induced them to slow down or even reverse capital account convertibility. In the 1990s convertibility in the 
capital account was advanced in developing countries but cautiously due to the high frequency of financial 
crises in that decade.29 
Financial integration in the post 1980 period shows various features that makes it different from the 
pre 1914 period of high international capital mobility. First, in the pre-1914 period, most capital inflows 
were unidirectional and took the form of long term capital. As Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) note the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany, main capital exporters at that time, took dominant one- way positions in 
their portfolios. The exception was the United States that had large capital outflows and inflows. Currently, 
most capital flows occur between rich and industrialized countries,which is an important difference with 
the first wave of globalization. At the turn of the 20th century, in 1900, the less developed countries of 
Asia, Latin America and Africa received 33% of global liabilities. In 1990 only 11% of global liabilities 
                                                     
26  The Schengen Treaty is an agreement originally signed in March 1995, by the seven EU countries. As of 2003 there are fifteen 
Schengen signatories and they include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. The goal of this treaty is to end border checkpoints and controls within the 
Schengen area and harmonize external border controls. Source: Wikipedia Encyclopedia.  
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schengen_treaty. 
27  Another case is important to note within U.S. immigration policies and that is Puerto Rico. Formerly a Spanish colony, Puerto Rico 
became a commonwealth state of the U.S. in 1898 during the Spanish-American War. Puerto Ricans were granted a special status of 
U.S. citizenship in 1917 that gave them all the rights and duties associated with American citizenship, except the right to vote in 
presidential elections. According to the 2000 census figures, Puerto Rico has a population of 3.6 million plus about 3.4 million 
Puerto Ricans living in the United States (see OECD, 2003). 
28  Source OECD (2003) “Trends in International Migration” p. 34. 
29  See Eichengreen ( 2003) and  Obstfeld and Taylor ( 2004). The crises of that period include Mexico 1994-95, Asia 1997, Russia 
1998, Brazil 1999, Turkey in 2001 and Argentina in 2001-02. 
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went to these same countries, which account for the bulk of the world population and a significant part of 
the world output. Also we can see that the majority of today’s asset holders, which are OECD countries, 
are also liability holders (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). Since the 1970s, gross stocks have expanded rapidly 
but not net stocks. In today’s world capital flows and foreign investment aims for risk sharing and 
diversification instead of long-term financing to build infrastructure and housing as was the case in the pre 
1914 world. Regarding the direction of international capital flows we face the so-called Lucas Paradox in 
which there is too little capital flows to capital-scarce, poor countries. As we discussed before the list of 
factors why this is the case include the lack of educated and properly trained work force in poor countries, 
lack of enforceable property rights, bureaucracy, political instability, weak institutions, small domestic 
markets and other factors. The literature of growth under increasing returns suggest that capital, skilled 
labor, superior institutions tend to go together and concentrate in a certain group of countries (Easterly 
2001). This is an important result that can help to explain why migration and capital flows tend to go 
together. Also, while the correlation of investments and savings demonstrates that the financial markets are 
not more integrated today than at the beginning of the 20th century, a change occurred in the composition 
of capital flows, especially an increase of the short-term capital flows relatively to long-term capital flows 
(Baldwin and Martin 1999). 
Another difference between the first wave of globalization and contemporaneous financial 
globalization is the importance of capital flows as proportion of savings and investment of source and 
receiving countries. Although financial globalization since the 1970s and 1980s has expanded very rapidly 
in relative terms it is lower than in the pre-1914 world. In fact, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) report that in 
1900-1913 overseas investment represented about one half of domestic savings of the U.K (and one-third, 
on average, between 1870 and 1914). In other capital exporter countries such as Germany, overseas 
investment represented about 10 percent of national savings in 1910-1913. In turn, around 50 percent of the 
capital stock of Argentina in 1914 was in hands of foreigners (in Canada and Australia that percentage was 
in the range 20-30 percent). These numbers are lower in the new wave of globalization. After 1970 the 
ratio of net capital outflows over savings in the capital exporting countries never exceeded 5 percent (this is 
influenced by the large current account deficits of the United States). In turn, capital inflows, on average, in 
the same period never exceeded 15 percent of investment in capital importing countries (Obstfeld and 
Taylor, 2004). 
After World War I British financial hegemony was replaced by the United States as the main 
capital exporter of the world economy. The US role as a net capital exporter lasted until the early 
1980s when it started to run persistent current account deficits, importing savings from the rest of 
the world to finance a level of expenditure above its real output.30 In 2002-2003 the current account 
deficit of the US is about 5 percent of its Gross Domestic Product or near 500 billion U.S dollars. In 
contrast, countries such as Japan, China, Korea are running large current account surpluses and/or 
holding large sotcks of international reserves in U.S. dollars in these years contributing to finance 
the savings short-fall of the United States (see table 7). 
Interactions. The evolution of international migration and capital flows has followed 
relatively similar trends since the second half of the 1940s. Taking as an indicator migration to the 
United States, both capital flows and migration followed a gradual increase between 1945 and about 
1980 to further accelerate afterwards. The direction of labor and capital flows is as follows: labor 
emigrates from relatively low real wages countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa to high real 
wage OECD countries (mainly United States, Canada and Europe) in a direction “south to –north”. 
In contrast, the direction of capital flows in the post 1980 period is dominantly “north-north” (say 
capital flows between rich -industrialized countries in “diversification-finance” fashion). The lack 
of sizeable and diversified capital flows to the south deprives these nations from potential new 
capital and new jobs; as a result people migrates to rich economies looking for better job 
opportunities. Of course this is a simplification as certain large and relatively poor countries such as 
                                                     
30  In the 1980s and up to 1993 and after 2000, U.S public sector  deficits contributed significantly to the current account deficits. 
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China and other Asian economies currently receive large of flows foreign investment. However, the 
pattern of international investment is tilted to a handful of countries. 
Historically international migration played an equalizing role in real wages between the old 
world and the new world boosting convergence. Today we observe large international inequality 
and restricted international migration preventing the full operation of this mechanism of 
convergence. Also the relative concentration of capital flows may preserve international inequalities 
as documented in Tables 3 to 5 that provide data of real-wages, GDP per hour worked and GDP per 
capita in several countries from 1870 to the 1990s. In turn, Table 5 also shows persistent and even 
widening gaps in GDP per capita between Latin America, Asia and Africa (developing countries) 
and richer Western Europe and Western Offshoots (United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand) throughout the 20th century. Also, tables 6 and 7 show how the direction of net migration 
flows and the savings investment balances can change over time. 
Table 3 
INTERNATIONAL REAL WAGES INDICES, 1870-1988 
(UK=100) 
1870 1913 1950 1973 1988 
USA 167 154 230 180 126 
Canada 143 199 112 176 139 
Australia 187 117 85 78 56 
Argentina 104 98 81 48 30 
      
UK 100 100 100 100 100 
Germany 84 83 74 115 113 
France 72 60 52 84 85 
Italy 34 50 90 102 108 
Spain 42 44 61 72 99 
Ireland 71 83 81 98 117 
Source: Williamson (1992). 
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Table 4 
LEVELS OF GDP PER HOUR WORKED, 1870-1998 
(USA=100) 
1870 1913 1950 1973 1998 
USA 100 100 100 100 100 
Canada 76 87 82 83 75 
Australia 154 107 76 73 78 
Argentina   49 45 39 
Brazil   20 24 23 
      
UK 113 84 63 67 100 
Germany 69 59 32 62 77 
France 61 56 46 76 98 
Italy 47 42 35 67 81 
Spain     64 
Ireland     78 
Source: Maddison (2001). 
 
Table 5 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA 
(as % of US’GDP per capita) 
Country and Region 1870 1900 1913 1930 1950 1980 2001 
China 22 13 10 9 5 6 13 
India 22 15 13 12 6 5 7 
Mexico 28 33 33 26 25 34 25 
Philippines 32 N.A. 20 24 11 13 9 
South Korea 25 N.A. 15 16 8 22 53 
Latin America* 20 19 20 N.A. 18 18 13 
African Countries** N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 9 8 5 
East Asian*** 23 15 13 N.A. 7 10 14 
United States 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Maddison (2003). 
Note: *15 Latin American Countries. **57 African Countries. ***16 East Asian Countries. N.A. Non 
available. 
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IV. Retrospect 
This paper shows that between 1870 and the early 21st century 
the world economy went through very different phases and policy 
regimes that affected in significant ways the direction and magnitudes 
of the international mobility of people and capital across countries and 
regions of the world. The first wave of globalization (1870-1913) 
entailed free international mobility of capital under the gold standard 
along with largely unrestricted labour mobility across national borders. 
This led to convergence in real wages and per capita income between 
the old and new worlds (Europe and the settler economies) but that 
convergence was largely absent for countries and regions outside that 
international circuit of “massive migration” and capital mobility. The 
pre- 1914 economic and political order collapsed with World War I, 
giving rise to two decades of economic instability, inflation, exchange 
and capital controls, depression and exacerbated nationalism. These 
trends were clearly inimical to both international migration and 
international capital mobility. Internartional trade became also more 
restrictive in that period. Attempts to restore the gold standard in the 
mid 1920s were ultimately inconsistent with the new realities of 
increasing social mobilization, stronger labour unions and growing 
demands for democratisation that shattered public finances and 
reduced the room for wage flexibility. After World War II a new 
economic and political equilibrium developed under a dominant role of 
the United States and a growing competition with the emergent 
socialist block. Until the early 1970s, domestic objectives of full 
employment, growth and social progress took prominence over 
international capital mobility. 
The Bretton Woods era presided over a quarter century of a “golden age of capitalism” 
characterized by rapid growth, stability and managed market economies. Nevertheless, the internal 
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contradictions of the system proved to be inescapable. The monetary order of the dollar-gold o 
fixed parities was abandoned in the early 1970s after cumulative fiscal deficits in the U.S and 
divergent trends in productivity growth among industrial economies. A system of floating exchange 
rates among main currencies substituted the Bretton Woods parities and gold convertibility was 
phased out. Capital markets started to flourish helped by the abundance of petrodollars and by the 
reduction of barriers to capital mobility among developed economies and gradually also in 
developing countries. In the 1990s the post-communist euphoria that took over global capital 
markets was only cooled –down by repeated financial crisis in Latin America, Asia and Russia. 
Currently an important part of international capital flows takes place between developed countries 
with mature and sophisticated financial systems and full convertibility in their capital accounts. A 
trend of north-north finance combined with south-north migration accompany the large disparities 
of national income per capita in the world economy. Convergence in per capita income takes place 
mainly between OECD economies as almost a century before it was between the old and new 
worlds. 
International migration flows started to pick-up in the 1980s and 1990s mainly to the United 
States, a country of many job and business opportunities, although migration flows measured as 
share of total U.S. population never reached the levels achieved in the first wave of globalization. 
Throughout the 20th century, with the exception of some years in the interwar period, the U.S was a 
net immigration country, first from Europe and then from developing countries. However in the 
1980s the United States started to run current account deficits and eventually became a net debtor 
country that sustain a higher level of domestic expenditure than output by drawing on savings from 
the rest of the world. How these imbalances will be corrected in the years ahead will be critical for 
the world economy and the patterns of labor migration and capital mobility. 
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Table 6 
NET IMMIGRATION (1) 
(per 1000 population) 
 Argentina United Kingdom  United States Ireland 
1871-1880 4.1 -4.7 3.8 -16.3(2) 
1881-1890 20.5 -7.1 6.0 -21.6(3) 
1891-1900 7.5 -2.9 2.1 -13.4(4) 
1901-1910 18.5 -5.7 6.9 -11.0 
1911-1920 3.9 -2.7 5.8 -4.9 
1921-1930 8.7 -3.6 2.1 -7.0 
1931-1940 1.3 NA -0.1 -4.3 
1941-1950 3.1 NA 0.5 -7.0 
1951-1960 2.8 NA 1.3 -13.8 
1961-1970 1.4 NA 1.2 -5.9 
1971-1980 NA NA 1.5 3.2 
1981-1990 -2.3 0.6 2.4 -5.7 
1991-2000 1.5 1.8 NA 2.2 
Period Historical 
1870-1913 13.0 -5.3 5.0 -1.2(1) 
1913-1950 3.3 -2.3 1.7 -0.6 
1950-1980 2.4 NA 1.6 -0.6 
1980-2002 -0.6 1.3 3.32(1) -0.1 
Selected Years 
1990 -8.5 1.5 6.3(1) -0.7 
2000 -3.5 3.1 3.1(1) 0.5 
2002 NA 2.9 3.7(1) 0.7 
Source: Argentine Government’s National Direction of Migration, 1970 Census Argentina and 
Maddison (2001) and Ferenczi and Wilcox (1929), OECD (2003), Central Statistics office Ireland 
(2003), 2002 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (USA) and UK 
Office for National Statistics. 
Note: (1) Net Immigration = Immigration minus emigration. (2) 1870. (3) 1881. (4) 1890. (5) 




 Table 7 
FOREIGN SAVINGS, DOMESTIC SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT, 1871-2002 
(as a share of GDP, percent) 
  Argentina*       United States** United Kingdom Japan* China Korea
  Sf/GDP                Sn/GDP I/GDP Sf/GDP Sn/GDP I/GDP Sf/GDP Sn/GDP I/GDP Sf/GDP Sn/GDP I/GDP Sf/GDP Sn/GDP I/GDP Sf/GDP Sn/GDP I/GDP
Per Decades 
1871-1880 NA        NA NA -0.4 20.6 20.3 -4.1 14.0 10.0 NA NA NA
1881-1890 15.4        -4.3 11.1 0.3 20.8 21.1 -5.5 13.8 8.3 0.7 12.9 13.6
1891-1900 9.3        -1.7 7.6 -0.8 23.1 22.3 -3.1 12.4 9.3 1.9 14.6 16.5
1901-1910 3.7        9.1 12.9 -0.9 22.3 21.4 -4.6 13.8 9.2 2.1 13.4 15.5
1911-1920 0.3        8.9 9.2 -3.0 16.7 13.7 -3.3 9.0 5.7 -2.9 21.9 19.0
1921-1930 11.0        0.7 11.7 -0.9 14.0 13.1 -2.1 10.6 8.5 1.5 15.4 16.9
1931-1940 -3.4        14.1 10.7 -0.5 7.4 6.9 2.0 6.9 9.0 0.1 15.3 15.4
1941-1950 -5.0        17.2 12.2 -0.6 11.6 11.0 4.1 3.6 7.7 -0.2 19.7 19.5
1951-1960 0.9        16.4 17.4 -0.1 16.2 16.1 -0.2 15.2 15.0 -0.3 24.3 24.0
1961-1970 -2.8        24.8 22.0 -0.5 19.7 19.2 0.4 18.8 19.2 -0.5 35.7 35.3
1971-1980 -0.1        26.1 26.0 0.4 19.6 20.0 0.4 19.3 19.7 -0.7 34.4 33.8
1981-1990 1.7        17.1 18.8 2.1 17.2 19.3 1.1 16.8 17.9 -2.4 32.1 29.7
1991-2000 3.2         15.4 18.6 1.8 17.2 19.0 1.4 15.5 17.0 -2.5 31.0 28.6
Period Historical 
1871-1913 8.7         2.1 10.8 -0.4 21.7 21.2 -4.6 13.8 9.1 1.8 13.9 15.7
1913-1950 0.2         10.5 10.7 -1.3 12.0 10.7 0.6 7.1 7.8 -0.5 18.1 17.6
1950-1980 -0.7         22.2 21.5 -0.1 18.5 18.4 0.1 17.7 17.8 -0.6 31.1 30.5
1980-2002 1.9         16.6 18.5 2.2 17.1 19.2 1.2 16.2 17.4 -2.3 31.2 28.9
Selected Years 
1990 -3.5   17.5 14.0 1.4 17.2 18.6 4.0 16.2 20.2 -1.5 34.3 32.8 -5.3 40.5 35.2 0.8 36.9 37.7
2000 3.3   14.2 17.5 4.2 16.6 20.8 2.0 15.5 17.5 -2.5 28.8 26.3 -1.9 38.2 36.4 -2.7 33.7 31.0
2002 -9.4   20.2 10.8 4.6 13.8 18.4 1.7 14.8 16.5 -3.2 27.1 23.9 -2.8 38.0 35.2 -1.1 30.2 29.1
International m
igration, capital flow
s and the global econom




Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (2004) and Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC (2003) and Taylor (1996). 
Note: *Since 1885. **Since 1874. Sf/GDP = Foreign Savings/Gross Domestic Product, Sn/GDP = Domestic Savings/Gross Domestic Product and I/GDP =  
Investment/Gross Domestic Product. N.A. = Non Available
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